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Violence Against Women
and the Commerce Clause:
Can This Marriage Survive?
BY JENNIFER C. PHILPOT*
INTRODUCTION
O f all the controversies in constitutional law, those surrounding
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause
have involved some of the most contentious political issues of this
century Throughout much of its history, the Commerce Clause has been
associated with an expansion of federal power against the receding
background of the Tenth Amendment.' New Deal programs implemented
during the Depression led to a broad interpretation of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause,2 and this judicial construction has
endured, largely without challenge.
Until recently The future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
been widely speculative after the United States Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Lopez.3 In that case, the Court held that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990' was not within the scope of Commerce
* J.D. expected, 1998, M.A., 1995, B.A., 1990, University of Kentucky
The author wishes to thank Paul E. Salamanca, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Kentucky College of Law, for his guidance m the writing of tis
Note.
' The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2 See Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
3 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
4 Pub. L. No. 101-647, 108 Stat. 4844 (1990). Lopez was charged with
violating a statutory provision formerly found at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994)). See
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Clause power.' The decision marked the first time m over sixty years
that the Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause.6
Commentators have been divided m their interpretation of the Lopez
decision. On one end of the spectrum, Lopez has been seen as merely a
warning to Congress that there must be some legislative fact-finding
explaining the relationship between the regulation and commercial
activity 7 Conversely, Lopez has also been read as a drastic narrowing of
the judicial interpretation of commerce. Under the latter reading, Lopez
signals a trend toward leaving certain areas of regulation, such as criminal
law, solely to the states! This Note proceeds from the position that
Lopez marks a shift in constitutional jurisprudence toward a more
restrictive construction of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.
As a study of the effects of Lopez, tis Note considers the constitu-
tionality of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"). 9
Congress founded VAWA partially on the federal government's power to
regulate activity under the Commerce Clause.'0 Since its enactment, two
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
s See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
6 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), was the last case to hold
that Congress had overstepped its regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause. The statute challenged in Carter Coal was the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935, wnch set maximum hours and minimum wages for
coal miners. Among the purposes of the Act was the stabilization of the
bituminous coal mining industry. See id. at 283-84. The Act's authors hoped that
tius stabilization would in turn facilitate the promotion of the industry m
interstate commerce. See id. at 278. Carter Coal is discussed at infra notes 46-48
and accompanying text. f
' See, e.g., Kathleen F Bnckey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause:
Life After Lopez, 46 CAsE W RES. L. REv 801, 839 (1996).
8 See, e.g., Michael C. Carroll & Paul R. Dehmel, Comment, United States
v Lopez: Reevaluating Congressional Authority Under the Commerce Clause,
69 ST. JOHN's L. REv 579, 600-03 (1995). Carroll and Debmel argue that Lopez
"is an appropriate step in establishing a firm framework for marking the bounds
of Congressional authority." Id. at 589-90.
9 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1902 (1994) (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994) (interstate domestic
violence) and 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (civil nghts for women)).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(a) (1994). This section explams the purpose of the
civil rights provisions:
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federal district courts have evaluated the Act's constitutionality In these
two decisions, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic" and Doe v. Doe,
2
the courts weighed VAWA in light of Lopez but reached opposite
conclusions about whether Congress's power under the Commerce Clause
extends to acts of violence against women.
The Lopez decision clearly directs an examination of VAWA's
constitutionality for two reasons: first, because Lopez sigifies a shift in
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause; second, because the statute struck down in Lopez is
remarkably similar to VAWA, the Lopez decision has great factual
relevance to the issue of VAWA's constitutionality "s Therefore, the
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as
well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose
of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commereby establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action
for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
Id. The question of whether VAWA is constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Note.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 226 (1994). This section provides criminal penalties for
"interstate domestic violence" and requires proof that the defendant either crossed
a state line or caused the victim to cross a state line:
(1) Crossing a State line. - A person who travels across a State line
or enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or
intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the
course of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of
violence and thereby causes bodily mjury to such spouse or intimate
partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(2) Causing the crossing of a State line. - A person who causes a
spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave
Indian country by force, coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course or
as a result of that conduct, intentionally commits a crime of violence
and thereby causes bodily injury to the person's spouse or intimate
partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Id. § 226(a).
" Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechmc & State Umv., 935 F Supp. 779 (W.D.
Va. 1996).
12 Doe v Doe, 929 F Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
3 One recent analysis of VAWA's constitutionality after Lopez comes to a
contrary conclusion about the decision's impact on Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. This study reverts to the principles articulated in Heart of Atlanta Motel,
1996-97]
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Brzonkala and Doe decisions must be assessed according to their
compliance with Lopez.
To illustrate the significance of Lopez, Part I of this Note examines
the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 4 This section traces the
relevant trends m interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
While early cases interpreted this power narrowly, the later and more
pervasive trend has been to construe the Commerce Clause broadly,
thereby giving Congress power to regulate activities that are more social
than economic m nature.
Part II discusses the Lopez decision itself and demonstrates how
Lopez marks another shift in judicial interpretation of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.' 5 After Lopez, arguably, the
principal test for determining whether an activity is within Congress's
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause is whether that activity has
substantial effects on interstate commerce. 6 By emphasizing that these
effects must be substantial in fact instead of m theory, the Lopez Court
has, at least rhetorically, limited the scope of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause.'7
Part III examines VAWA in conjunction with the Brzonkala and Doe
decisions." The Brzonkala decision appropriately uses Lopez as the
relevant precedent and concludes that VAWA is unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause. 9 Alternatively, the Doe court effectively ignores
the substantial effects test announced by Lopez and holds that VAWA is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.2" Part III demonstrates that
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), concluding from an application of
those principles that VAWA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. This
approach is based on the notion that Lopez does not guide an examination of
VAWA's constitutionality See Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated
Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLuM. L. REv 1876, 1923-25 (1996). For
a further discussion of tis study, see infra note 175. For a description of the
principles articulated in Heart of Atlanta Motel, see infra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text.
14 See ifra notes 24-65 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
16 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
17 See id. at 1634.
's See infra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
19 See Brzonkala, 935 F Supp. at 793.
20 See Doe, 929 F Supp. at 612-13, 615, 617
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Lopez cannot be so easily sidestepped in analyzing VAWA's constitution-
ality
Part IV then applies Lopez to VAWA itself.2 Of pivotal importance
is the Lopez Court's emphasis on the lack of a jurisdictional element -
a nexus with commerce - in the Gun-Free School Zones Act.2 Part IV
concludes that VAWA also lacks this jurisdictional assurance that each
case ansing under its civil provisions has a nexus with interstate
commerce. Another crucial factor considered by the Lopez Court is the
increasing federalization of criminal law.23 While it contains civil
sections, VAWA is, like the statute at issue in Lopez, primarily concerned
with local crime rather than interstate commercial activity An application
of these factors to VAWA, as the Lopez Court applied them to the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, leads to the inevitable conclusion that VAWA
cannot stand on the basis of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
I. THE HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Congressional power to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause
has histoncally been one of the most important powers enumerated in the
Constitution. The clause allows Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states."'24 Although the language
of the clause announces an absolute federal power, the scope of this
power has been one of the most unwieldy and controversial abstractions
in constitutional law.
The Lopez decision reflects a history of judicial struggle with this
abstraction. Potentially, Lopez could narrow Congress's power to regulate
intrastate activity, thereby marking a return to the judicial construction of
the Commerce Clause prior to the New Deal era.25 The early Commerce
Clause cases generally reserved to the states the power to regulate
21 See infra notes 136-83 and accompanying text.
22 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the Court's requirement of a jurisdictional element.
' See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25 See Philip P Fnekey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings,
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W REs. L.
REv 695, 707 (1996) ("Assessing this problem [of Lopez] requires returning to
the pre-New Deal era in which congressional power to regulate intrastate
activities under the Commerce Clause was the exception, not the rule.
Indeed, Lopez indicates that, to understand the sudden disarray on the current
scene, one must go back to what just might be the future." Id.).
1996-97]
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activities of local concern.26 However, after Roosevelt began efforts to
implement the New Deal m 1933,27 the Court's interpretation of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause underwent radical
expansion. The New Deal era cases generally allowed Congress to
regulate any activity that affected interstate commerce, regardless of its
local or intrastate nature. Tis broad interpretation of Congress's
Commerce Clause power persisted until the Court's recent decision m
Lopez.
Commonly understood as the begiming of Commerce Clause history,
Gibbons v. Ogden2' broadly defined the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. In Gibbons, the Supreme Court held that
power to regulate commerce "comprehend[s] every species of commercial
intercourse ' 29 that is international or between the states, and that the
power to regulate "cannot stop at the external boundary of each State."30
However, the Gibbons Court qualified tis broad construction of
congressional power with its assertion that federal regulation did not
extend to commerce "which is completely internal."'
In application, the Gibbons construction acted as a constraint on state
regulations that adversely affected interstate commerce. Of primary
significance was the assertion in Gibbons that only Congress has power
to regulate commerce.32 Tlus interpretation of the scope of congressional
power to regulate commerce was largely followed until the enactment of
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890. These Acts led to an examination of the Commerce Clause's
antagonistic effects on an increasingly expansive federal government and
on its attempts to regulate commercial activities.
26 See Id.
27 See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1987).
28 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). Gibbons involved a
challenge to the intrastate monopoly of steamboat operations. See zd. at 1. Ogden
was granted authority by the state of New York to operate steamboats from New
York to New Jersey. Gibbons also began such operations under the authority of
a federal statute. See id. at 6-9 The Court held that Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce extended to steamboat operations between the states, even
though such federal regulation interfered with intrastate activity. The injunction
issued by a New York court preventing the Gibbons operation was therefore held
invalid. See id. at 194-95, 221.
29 Id. at 193.
30 Id. at 194.
31 id.
32 See id. at 199-200.
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The Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act began
a gradual extension of traditional definitions of commerce.33 The
Supreme Court considered the validity of the Sherman Antitrust Act m
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.34 Concluding that manufacturing was
distinct from commerce, the Court held that Congress could not use the
Commerce Clause to prohibit monopolies m manufacturing.35 The Court
further held that Congress could exercise its Commerce Clause power
only when the activity regulated had a direct relationship with interstate
commerce, as distinguished from the indirect relationship identified in
E.C. Knight. The Court's ruling was based on the rationale that states
have the right to regulate purely local activities, including manufactur-
mg.
36
In Champion v. Ames ("The Lottery Case"), 37 however, the Court
found that Congress could regulate interstate commerce m order to
prevent activities that were detrimental to the general populace even
though the detrimental effect occurred entirely intrastate. Specifically,
Champion allowed Congress to prohibit the interstate shipment of lottery
tickets through an exercise of the Commerce Clause power.38 The Court
33 See Robert Wax, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Continued
Ambiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP L. REv 275, 278
(1996). Wax explains the impact of these Acts:
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, formation of a monopoly was
a violation of federal law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). The Sherman Act
did not limit itself to the regulation of interstate commerce resulting
from a monopoly. Instead, any contract resulting m the restraint of trade
between two states violates §§ 1 & 3. Id. §§ 1, 3. Moreover, these
regulations did not attempt to limit interstate commerce, but rather dealt
with larger commerial transactions that happened to possibly include
interstate commerce. The Court stated that regulations of the manufac-
turing process affecting interstate commerce would lead to federal
regulation of "every branch of human industry."
Id. at 279 n.36 (quoting United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14
(1895)).
31 United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In E.C. Knight, the
United States charged the E.C. Knight Co. with attempting to monopolize the
sugar industry through purchasing competing refineries, a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust laws. E.C. Knight defended the suit by challenging the
constitutionality of the laws. See id. at 1-2.
" See id. at 14, 17
36 See id. at 13-14, 17
37 Champion v Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
38 See id. at 363-64.
1996-97]
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reasoned that Congress could prohibit interstate transport of an object
when that object threatened common perceptions of morality 39 Though
the Court stated that its decision was not an attempt to "interfere with
traffic or commerce in lottery tickets carned on exclusively witlun the
limits of any State,"' Champion was subsequently understood to stand
for the principle that Congress could implement a moral police power
through the Commerce Clause.1
The Court's decision in Houston, East & West Texas Railway v.
United States ("The Shreveport Rate Case")42 was a further step away
from the holding in E. C. Knight. In Shreveport, the Court upheld federal
legislation that allowed the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate
intrastate railway rates. The Court held that the railway's practice of
charging higher rates for interstate hauls than it did for those solely
within state boundaries had an adverse effect on interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Court concluded that regulation of such rates was within
Congress's Commerce Clause power. In coming to this decision, the
Court held that congressional regulation extended to any activity that had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 3 After tlus decision, the
focus of Commerce Clause analysis was no longer on the directness of
the activity's effect on interstate commerce, nor was the intrastate
distinction determinative.
The Court's decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart4 was one of the last
decisions of the pre-New Deal era. Retreating from its moral justifications
in Champion, the Hammer Court held that Congress did not have power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate transportation of goods
produced by child labor. The Court distinguished Champion from
Hammer by explaining that the legislation in Champion involved goods
that were themselves an evil to society, and therefore within Congress's
power to regulate, whereas the legislation in Hammer regulated the
production of goods and not the goods themselves. The Court held that
39 See id. at 357
40 Id.
41 See Wax, supra note 33, at 281 ("Champion represented a use of the
Commerce Clause power to regulate intrastate conduct by preventing certain
interstate exchanges, based mainly on Congress's motive to prohibit what it
classified as detrimental social behavior.").
42 Houston, E. & W Tex. Ry. v United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
41 See id. at 358-59. The Court subsequently retreated from this broad test.
See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
"Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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Congress had no power to regulate what was essentially an "evil"
involving local employment practices.
45
Similar analyses were used in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.46 and
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,47 cases that distin-
guished commerce from manufacturing, production, and shipment. In
Carter Coal and Schechter, the Court struck down legislation that
regulated pre-commercial activity such as manufacturing, reasoning that
such activity had only an indirect effect on interstate commerce.48
Consequently, there was a brief yet notable retreat from the rule
announced in Shreveport and a return to the directness test set forth in
E.C. Knight.
49
With the enactment of New Deal programs that greatly expanded the
scope of federal legislation, the Commerce Clause was transformed into
a vehicle for extending federal power. The Court's decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.5" was a manifesto of this transformation.
At issue m Jones & Laughlin was the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, which forced employers to recognize unionized labor. The Act
41 See id. at 273-74.
46 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In Carter Coal, the
president of Carter Coal Co. challenged the validity of a tax Imposed on the
company under the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The Act imposed
a tax on either the sales price or fair market value of all coal mined by
companies that did not comply with the Act's provisions, regulating the hours
and wages of coal mimng employees. The Court found that since the Act
regulated activities involved m the production of, instead of the sale of coal, the
Act fell beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. Activities that have only an
indirect effect on Commerce, such as the production of a good, were found to
be local in nature and therefore subject to local regulation alone. See id.
4' A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
In Schechter, a poultry company challengedthe validity of the National Industrial
Recovery Act ("NIRA"). Through NIRA, the President could prescribe "codes
of fair competition" for certain industries. Like the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act, NIRA was enacted in order to stabilize trade and industry. The
Schechter Court held that provisions of NIRA which regulated prices, mimmum
wages, and maximum hours were unconstitutional on two primary grounds: the
activities regulatedwere found to be outside the "stream" of interstate commerce,
since all interstate transactions ceased as soon as shipments were received by the
poultry company; and the activities regulated had only an redirect effect on
interstate commerce. See id.
41 See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 303-04; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548-49
49 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
'0 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
1996-97]
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essentially gave employees collective bargaining power against manufac-
turers.5 The steel corporation argued that tins legislation was "an
attempt to regulate all industry, thus invading the reserved powers of the
States over their local concerns."'52 In a complete reversal of its reason-
ing in E.C. Knight, Carter Coal, and Schechter Poultry, the Supreme
Court held that Congress did have power to regulate manufacturing. The
Court stated that the relationship between interstate commerce and
manufacturing was "close and intimate," and that Congress, therefore,
had power to regulate labor relations.53 More significantly, because
Jones & Laughlin had business operations in several states, the Court
found that a labor strike would substantially affect interstate com-
merce.
54
As a result of Jones & Laughlin, the nexus previously required
between intrastate activities and interstate commerce was drastically
relaxed. Subsequent cases such as United States v. Darb5 and Wickard
v. Filburn5 6 fully illustrated the gravity of this shift in Commerce Clause
analysis. In Darby, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, which prescribed minmum wages and maximnum hours for industry
workers. The Act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods that were produced in violation of the Act's provisions. Darby
represents a disregard for the pnor concern exhibited in Hammer that
federal regulations prohibiting the shipment of goods in interstate
commerce would encroach on the authority of the states. The Darby
Court reiterated the broad scope of Commerce Clause power, and stated
moreover that Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce was not
restricted by the Tenth Amendment.57
Wickard finalized the judicial campaign for federal power with its
holding that cultivation of wheat for home consumption affected interstate
commerce.5" With its decision in Wickard, the Court established the
cumulative effects test, which permitted congressional regulation of any
51 See id. at 22-23.
52 Id. at 29
53 See id. at 43.
14 See id. at 41-42.
55 United States v Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
56 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 114, 123 (holding that the Tenth Amendment is
but a "truism" reserving to the states whatever powers are not held by the federal
government, id. at 123.).
58 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111.
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activity if the aggregate effects of the activity would produce an overall
detriment to interstate commerce. 59
After Wickard, Congress had the power to regulate any activity
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The commerce power
continued to expand, eventually allowing social, as well as economic,
regulation. Perhaps the most dramatic step in this expansion came in 1964
when, in Katzenbach v. McClung6 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 61 the Court extended the Commerce Clause to include
regulation of racial discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 required
public accommodations, such as hotels and restaurants, to serve their
customers "'without regard to their race or color. ' ' 62 In Heart of
Atlanta, the Court upheld the public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power. The
Court reasoned that since racial discrimination could deter interstate
travel, Congress could regulate discrimination under the Commerce
Clause.63 Tis decision was upheld in Katzenbach, a case involving
racial discrimination by an Alabama restaurant. The Katzenbach Court
held that since the food served by the restaurant had moved in interstate
commerce, this connection was enough to bring it within the reach of
Congress's regulatory power.'
This broad interpretation of Commerce Clause power has persisted.
Not until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez65 has
there been any serious doubt about Congress's ability to regulate any
activity that affects interstate commerce, however remotely By closely
examining the nexus between the activity regulated and its connection to
interstate commerce, Lopez heralds a potential return to the Commerce
Clause interpretation of the pre-New Deal era.
I. THE LOPEZ OPINION
In March of 1992, Alfonso Lopez was discovered carrying a gun in
a San Antomo, Texas public high school. Lopez, a twelfth-grade student,
was initially arrested under a Texas law prohibiting possession of a
'9 See id. at 124-25.
60 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
6! Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
62 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
63 See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253.
64 See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-300.
65 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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firearm on school premises. The state charges were dismissed when
federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.
66
After a federal grand jury indicted Lopez for violating the Act, Lopez
moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Congress had no
power to exercise control over state public schools. The district court
denied the motion, conducted a bench tral, and found Lopez guilty
Lopez was sentenced to six months in prison and two years of supervi-
sion upon release. Lopez appealed, arguing that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
Based on what it "charactenze[d] as insufficient congressional findings
and legislative history," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed,
and Lopez's conviction was reversed.67
A. Majority Opinion - Rehnquist, C.J., Joined by O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, J.J.
The United States Supreme Court began its review of the Lopez case
with a careful discussion of Commerce Clause precedent. The outcome
of this review was predictable if not apparent when Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed that even Jones & Laughlin,
Darby, and Wickard confirm that Commerce Clause power "is subject to
outer limits., 6 Taking a novel approach to Jones & Laughlin, the Court
cited this case for the principle that Commerce Clause power "'may not
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect
and remote that to embrace them would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government."' 69 Following this principle, the
Court affirmed the rational basis standard of review for determining
whether a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce.
66 See Pub. L. No. 101-647, 108 Stat. 4844 (1990) (making it "unlawful for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone," quoted in Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed. Supp. V))).
Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 922 governs unlawful acts involving firearms. The Gun-
Free School Zones Act, in its entirety, comprises 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
67 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
6 Id. at 1628.
69 Id. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937)).
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The Court then reviewed the three categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under the Commerce Clause: the channels of interstate
commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce; and activities that have a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.7" Conceding that its precedent has been
unclear as to whether activities within the third category must "affect" or
"substantially affect" interstate commerce, the Court stated that the
substantial effects test is the proper analysis.7
The Court determined that the Gun-Free School Zones Act must fit
within this third category of regulation if it falls within Commerce Clause
power at all.72 In applying the substantial effects test to the Act, the
Court emphasized that the previous cases upholding regulation of
intrastate activity had involved activities that were commercial or
economic in nature. In comparison, the Court found that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act was "a crtimial statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms."73 Further, the Act was not found to be
part of a larger legislative scheme to regulate economic activity Based
on these determinations, the Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act could not be upheld as regulation of an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.74
The second flaw the Court found fatal to the Gun-Free School Zones
Act was the absence of a "jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce."75 The Court implied that such a jurisdic-
tional requirement might have rendered the Act constitutional, since it
would have restricted the act to regulation of firearms that "have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce., 76 Similarly
problematic was the lack of congressional findings on the nexus between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce. While allowing that
Congress is not required to provide this nexus, the Court stated that such
findings would illuminate Congress's conclusion that the regulated
activity did substantially affect interstate commerce.77
70 See id. at 1629-30.
71 See id. at 1630.
72 See Id.
73 Id. at 1630-31.
74 See id. at 1631.
75Id.
76 id.
7 See id. at 1632.
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At trial, the government had argued that possession of guns near
schools could result in violent crime, which could in turn deter interstate
travel to areas of the country thought to be unsafe, raise national expenses
through insurance costs, and damage the educational process by threaten-
mg the learning environment, the result of which would be a less
productive society 78
For reasons based largely on principles of federalism, the Court
rejected these arguments. In rejecting the "costs of crime" reasoning, the
Court noted that adopting the argument would permit Congress to
regulate virtually all activities that lead to violent crime, regardless of
their effects on interstate commerce.79 The Court was no more persuad-
ed by the "national productivity" argument, explaining that under this
reasoning, "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens.""0 The Court gave
family law as an example, illustrating that the "national productivity"
argument would allow Congress to regulate mamage, divorce, and child
custody 81
The Court concluded its opinion by re-emphasizing that "possession
of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce." 2 The Court reasoned that Lopez "was a local
student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently
moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his
possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce." 3 In order to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
Court stated that it "would have to pile inference upon inference m a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.84
B. Concurrence - Kennedy, J., Joined by O'Connor, J.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, focused
on the importance of stability in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 1634.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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Kennedy insisted that the Court cannot stray from the "essential
principals" which have governed prior Commerce Clause decisions.
Stressing the need for a "healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government," Kennedy stated that the judiciary must
intervene when the legislature attempts to regulate areas traditionally
governed by the states.8 5 Kennedy believed that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was such an encroachment upon states' rights. Kennedy also
expressed concern that there was no commercial purpose behind the
statute, and therefore Commerce Clause jurisdiction was inappropriate.
Despite his conclusion that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, Kennedy's concurrence was
not unqualified. He warned that because Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is highly political, the Court must be aware that in some situations
judicial intervention is not appropriate.
C. Concurrence - Thomas, J.
In hs concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that
Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
the Gun-Free School Zones Act. However, Thomas asserted that a
"substantial effects" test is mconsistent with both the Court's precedent
and the intent of the Framers. 6 Thomas did not believe that Congress
has authority "over all activities that 'substantially affect' interstate com-
merce."87 He feared that this test could logically be appended to any
other federal power allowing the government to regulate any activity that
"substantially affects" any area of federal regulation. Justice Thomas
concluded with the assertion that despite its establishment of a "substan-
tial effects" test, the majority opinion merely enforced the Constitution
and therefore "should not be viewed as 'radical' or another 'wrong turn'
that must be corrected in the future.
' 88
D. Dissent - Stevens, J
Of the dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens's is the most brief, arguing
simply that possession of guns is a consequence of commercial activity
85 Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurnng).
86 See id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurning).
88 Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concumng).
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and therefore may be regulated by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. 9
E. Dissent - Souter, J.
Justice Souter's dissent, perhaps the most instructive of all the
separate opimons, focused on the fact that the standard of scrutiny
actually applied by the majority is much stricter than rational basis
review Like Justice Thomas, Souter was concerned with balance of
power issues, but Souter felt that the judiciary should maintain deference
to the legislature.
Souter analyzed the majority opinon and the standard of rational
basis review with great precision, and it is this precision which illustrates
the inconsistencies between Lopez and the traditional test. Souter stated
that m prior Commerce Clause decisions, the only issue before the Court
was whether the congressional findings underlying the legislation were
within the realm of reason. If so, the only remaining question was
whether the congressional means implemented by the statute were
reasonably related to the end allowed by the Constitution.9" Yet in
Lopez, the majority upset the traditional analysis by suggesting that less
deference to legislative findings is necessary when the activity regulated
is non-commercial in nature. Furthermore, because the majority expressed
concerns about federalism, Souter feared that the Court might return to
the more intrusive review characterized by early Commerce Clause
cases.9" Souter warned that this type of review is mconsistent with the
judicial role.
F Dissent - Breyer, J., Joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, J.J.
Also instructive for its insight into the standard of review used m
Lopez, Justice Breyer's dissent pointed out that under the traditional
standard, the Gun-Free School Zones Act would clearly have survived
judicial scrutiny 92 Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg,
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on the reasonableness of the legislative
conclusion that guns near schools have substantial effects on interstate
commerce. Breyer asserted that the Court's task was to determine whether
89 See id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 See id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92 See id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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or not Congress could have rationally concluded there was a connection
between violence near schools and interstate commerce. He asserted that
"the answer to tis question must be yes," since "[n]umerous reports and
studies make clear that Congress could reasonably have found the
empirical connection that its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts." 93
In applying Lopez to other federal statutes, the separate and dissenting
opinons must be considered along with the majority, since the impact of
the decision is not yet clear. Also, because Lopez is a five to four
decision, concerns expressed by the minority could easily influence the
outcome of similar Commerce Clause cases. If the Supreme Court
reviews the constitutionality of VAWA, those concerns will surely be
revisited.
Im. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACr
Enacted as part of the 1994 Crime Control Act,94 VAWA provides
both criminal penalties and civil rights remedies for acts of violence
motivated by gender. VAWA has its jurisdictional basis both in the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment95 and in the Com-
merce Clause. The purpose of the VAWA is to bring to national attention
the problem of violence against women and the insufficiency of state
remedies to combat that problem.96 One of the VAWA's drafters, U.S.
Senator Joseph R. Biden, has stated that federal legislation is necessary
to provide women with relief from gender-based violence, since many
states are unwilling either to enforce existing remedies or to create new
ones that are more effective.97
VAWA contains a variety of criminal provisions for acts of violence
against women, and these clearly incorporate a jurisdictional element for
interstate enforcement. The criminal junsdictional provision states that:
A person who travels across a state line or enters or leaves Indian
country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's
spouse or intimate partner, and who in the course of or as a result of
9' Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94 Violent Crane Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
9S U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
96 See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual
Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REv 1285, 1301 (1994).
9' See id.
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such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby
causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be
puished as provided 98
Since the interstate enforcement provision is codified in a criminal section
of the United States Code,99 it seems clear that the provision extends to
all the criminal penalties within VAWA. It is likely that the criminal
section of the VAWA would withstand scrutiny because of the explicit
jurisdictional language included by Congress.
However, there is no comparable interstate enforcement provision
pertaining to the civil rights remedies created by the VAWA.Y°0 This
98 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994).
99 Title 18 of the U.S. Code generally covers criminal provisions.
'oo See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994). Section 13981 appears in Title 42 of the U.S. Code which generally
covers public health and welfare; specifically, the section appears in a portion of
the Code providing civil rights remedies for acts of violence against women.
Subsection (a) contains reference to the general jurisdictional basis for the civil
rights provision, but the section contains no requirement of proof of interstate
activity as the criminal provision does.
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as
well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose
of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerceby establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action
for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection
(d) of tlus section).
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the
right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief
as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For the purposes of this section -
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absence leaves open a critical question concerning the constitutionality of
the civil rights remedy based on Commerce Clause jurisdiction. With the
Lopez opinion's focus on the lack of such a junsdictional provision in the
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least m part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means -
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
against the person or that would constitute a felony against
property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical
injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of
State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal
charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those
acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or
prison jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute
a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual
against whom such action is taken.
(e) Lnitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action
under subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence
unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within
the meaning of subsection (d) of thns section).
(2) No prior crimial action
Nothing in this section requires a prior crimmal complaint,
prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of
action under subsection (c) of this section.
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrentjurisdiction
over actions brought pursuant to this part.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of Title 28 nor subsection (c) of this
section shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such
subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction
over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce,
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree.
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Gun-Free School Zones Act, tius issue may be crucial in determiing
whether the civil rights remedy in VAWA is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause.
Two federal district courts have recently evaluated the civil rights
remedy in VAWA and have come to opposite conclusions about its
constitutionality The first of these decisions, Doe v. Doe,'°' held that
the civil rights remedy was constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
The Doe court did not address the VAWA's constitutionality under the
Fourteenth Amendment, since this was not challenged. The second
decision, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University,10 2 held
that the civil rights remedy was unconstitutional under both the Com-
merce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Doe v Doe
The Doe case involves a wife who brought an action against her
husband under VAWA, alleging that her husband had subjected her to a
pattern of physical and mental abuse from 1978 to 1995. The husband
moved to dismiss on grounds that the civil remedy was unconstitutional.
He claimed that Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause
to enact a civil rights remedy for gender-based violence.0 3 In reviewing
the statutory provisions of VAWA, the Doe court made extensive
reference to the statute's legislative lustory and concluded that there was
a rational basis for determimng that gender-based violence affects
interstate commerce.' ° The Doe court found that since Lopez did not
abandon rational basis review, the scope of its own review was limited
to that standard.1
0 5
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the presence of legislative
findings in VAWA,0 6 and, therefore, distinguished it from the statute
at issue in Lopez.'0 7 The Doe court also found that the civil rights
provisions of VAWA met the substantial effects test of Lopez.'
Doe v. Doe, 929 F Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
102 Brzonkalav Virginia Polytechnic& State Umv., 935 F Supp. 779 (W.D.
Va. 1996).
103 See Doe, 929 F Supp. at 610.
'o See id.
105 See zd. at 612.
106 The court fully describes the investigative process used by Congress, as
well as the conclusions reached. See id. at 610-11.
1"7 See id. at 613.
'08 See id.
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However, in its analysis, the court compared the facts before it to those
m Wickard v. Filburn°9 instead of to those in Lopez, the more relevant
and timely comparison. Ignoring Lopez altogether, the Doe court reasoned
that:
Certainly the repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding,
withdrawing or limiting their participation in the workplace or
marketplace in response to or as a result of gender-basedviolence or the
threat thereof, is of such a nature to be as substantial an impact on
interstate commerce as the effect of excess "home-grown" wheat
harvesting."'
Lastly, the court found that the civil rights provision of VAWA did
not encroach on areas of traditional state concern, because the statute was
designed to complement rather than supplant existing state law . In
support of this position, Judge Arterton emphasized that "nothing in
VAWA precludes a victim of domestic violence from bringing a tort
action in state court for assault and battery or intentional infliction of
emotional distress."" 2 The purpose of VAWA, according to Arterton,
is to bring to society's attention the principle that gender-motivated
crimes are a violation of the victim's civil rights."'
Given this acknowledgment of the VAWA's connection to the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is significant that the issue of a Commerce
Clause jurisdictional requirement for individual causes of action was not
addressed by the Doe court. With this omission, Judge Arterton seems to
imply that Commerce Clause jurisdiction for the civil rights remedy is
either assumed from the criminal provisions, or is unnecessary given the
clear jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment. At any rate, unlike
the Lopez Court, Judge Arterton never discusses the need for individual
causes of action, under Commerce Clause-based statutes, to have a
connection with interstate commerce. This omission characterizes the
difference between the Doe and Brzonkala opinions. While Doe generally
ignores Lopez and uses Wickard as the basis for its substantial effects test,
Brzonkala relies on the Lopez analysis almost exclusively
'09 See id. at 614 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
"0 Id. at 614.
.. See id. at 616.
112 d.
11 See id.
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B. Brzonkala v Virginia Polytechnic and State Umversity
The Brzonkala case involved a female college student at Virginia
Polytechnic and State Umversity who was sexually assaulted by two men.
The student, Brzonkala, brought a civil rights action under VAWA
against the school as well as against the two men, alleging that the acts
were motivated by gender bias. Judge Kiser dismissed the claims against
both the school and the men, based on his finding that VAWA was
unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment."
4
Judge Kiser began his analysis by examinmg the Act's constitutional-
ity under the Commerce Clause as interpreted by Lopez. The Brzonkala
court segmented the substantial effects test as applied in Lopez into four
parts. First, Lopez "noted the relevance of the nature of the regulated
activity"; second, Lopez "considered whether [the Gun-Free School Zones
Act] had any jurisdictional element to ensure m individual cases that the
firearm possession would affect interstate commerce"; third, the Court
"considered the importance of legislative history"; and fourth, Lopez
"considered the practical implications of accepting the Government's
argument that the economic impact of the regulated activity had sufficient
effects on interstate commerce to sustain the regulation.""' 5
In applying the Lopez substantial effects test to VAWA, Judge Kiser
emphasized that "[t]he differences between Lopez and the case at hand
are insignificant, and the similarities are significant."'1 6 The three
superficial differences identified by Kiser are that: (1) the relevant
provision in VAWA is civil, while the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
criminal; (2) VAWA contains legislative findings while the statute m
Lopez did not; and (3) there are fewer steps of causation between the
activity regulated in VAWA and interstate commerce than there were
"' See Brzonkala v Virginia Polytechnic & State Umv., 935 F Supp. 779,
801 (W.D. Va. 1996). The Brzonkala court concluded that "VAWA is an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power, unjustified under either the
Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
However, the court did not have the opportunity to consider the criminal
components of VAWA. The only portion of VAWA properly before the
Brzonkala court was the civil rights provision. See id. at 782-83 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 13981 and no other portion of VAWA); id. at 785 (entitling Part V of
the opimon "Whether VAWA (42 U.S.C. § 13981) Is Constitutional").
"5 Id. at 786-87
116 Id. at 789.
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between the Gun-Free School Zones Act and interstate commerce.'
1 7
The significant sunilarties are that: (1) both the Gun-Free School Zones
Act and VAWA are criminal in nature; (2) both statutes are non-
commercial; (3) both lack a jurisdictional requirement "that some effect
on interstate commerce is involved"; (4) both attempt to regulate activity
which has a remote effect on commerce; and (5) both raise significant
questions about federalism." 8
Judge Kiser stated that the possible differences between the two
statutes actually point to their similarities. Addressing the significance of
legislative findings in VAWA, Kiser cited Lopez for the point that such
findings are neither necessary nor sufficient for a judicial determination
of constitutionality "' According to Kiser, the Lopez Court did not
evaluate the legislative findings provided in the amended version of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act because they were unnecessary to the task
at hand. Kiser stated that "commerce power is based on a reasonable
effect on interstate commerce, not on Congress's perceived effect on
commerce."' 0 Essentially, Kiser found that the legislative findings
provided in VAWA are insigmficant to its constitutionality Kiser
described the Lopez Court's concern with legislative findings as "one
feather with which to fill an already full pillow ""'
Similarly insignificant for Kiser was the fact that the VAWA
provisions at issue were civil while the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
crmmal. Kiser observed that "VAWA was designed to address problems
in the state criminal system, and, in attempting to supplement deficiencies
in the state criminal system, it creates a civil cause of action that seeks
to vindicate a criminal act."' 2 As Kiser explained, however, the proper
analysis turns not on whether the statute is civil or criminal, but rather on
whether the activity is economic in nature. This analysis then turns to an
evaluation of the activity's effects on interstate commerce.
Although with VAWA the steps, or inferences, from the regulated
activity to commerce are fewer than with the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, Kiser stated that "an analysis of the steps of causation is an inexact
science; the number of steps depends on how each step is defined."' 3
117 See id.
118 Id.
". See id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 1632
(1995)).
120 Td.
121 Id. at 790.
122 Id.
m. Id.
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VAWA regulates acts of violent crime, while the Lopez statute regulated
activities that could lead to violent crime. Kiser found this difference
irrelevant, since both the Gun-Free School Zones Act and VAWA are so
remote from interstate commerce that the distance between the steps in
each case is unclear. For Judge Kiser, the important focus in the
causation analysis was not the number of steps involved, but the
proximity of the regulated activity to commerce. 24 What Kiser gleaned
from comparing the steps of causation involved in the Gun-Free School
Zones Act and VAWA was that both regulated an activity too remote
from interstate commerce to be governed by the Commerce Clause.
Kiser was much more interested m the similarities between the Gun-
Free School Zones Act and VAWA. To begin with, Kiser said that both
the Lopez statute and VAWA involved "intrastate activity which is not
commercial or even economic in nature."'25 Like the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, VAWA regulated local criminal activity Kiser rejected the
Doe decision and criticized its reliance on Wickard: "[a]fter Lopez,
reliance on Wickard to analyze the commerce power in a case involving
a non-economic intrastate activity is not tenable."' 26 Judge Kiser
read Lopez as distinguishing Wickard precisely because the activity
regulated in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not economic in nature.
Therefore, Wickard was inappropriate for a constitutional analysis of
VAWA.
Judge Kiser also departed from the Doe opimon with Ins observation
that VAWA, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, "does not have a
jurisdictional requirement limiting each individual case to situations
involving interstate commerce." I27 Judge Kiser admitted that "it is
unclear whether such a jurisdictional requirement is needed,"'28 but
cited examples of statutes similar to VAWA where courts have found
them necessary Kiser relied primarily on United States v. Bass'29 for
tis proposition. In Bass, the defendant was convicted for possession of
firearms under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, wich
authorized punishment for any convict "'who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm." "
30
124 See id. at 791.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 792.
128 Id.
129 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
130Brzonkala, 935 F Supp. at 792 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 337).
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The prosecution in Bass argued that a connection to interstate
commerce was necessary only for the transportation element of the
statute, and not for receipt or possession. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the Second Circuit stated that accepting the prosecution's
interpretation of the statute would make its constitutionality questionable.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but in so doing explicitly applied the
interstate commerce requirement to all three elements of the statute. As
the basis for its decision, the Court reasoned that "ambiguity in criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" and preservation of the
"federal-state balance."'' In reaching beyond Lopez for support of this
principle, Judge Kiser emphasized that jurisdictional requirements are
important to the constitutionality of federal statutes enacted under the
Commerce Clause.
Finally, Judge Kiser discussed the federalism issue. He stated that
upholding VAWA, like upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
"would have the practical result of excessively extending Congress's
power and of inappropriately tipping the balance away from the
states."' 32 Judge Kiser inferred from both "common sense" and from
the congressional findings in VAWA that the effects on interstate
commerce from violence against women are incidental. Following the
reasomng in Lopez, Judge Kiser posited that a mere showing that
something affects the national economy "does not suffice to show that it
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."', If tis tenuous chain
of causation were accepted as a basis for Commerce Clause power, then
"Congress's power would extend to an unbounded extreme."' 134 As an
example, Judge Kiser noted that "insomnia costs the United States $15
billion a year," and that insomniacs "travel across state lines for
treatment.' ' 35 Under the national productivity argument, Congress
would be authorized to regulate insomnia. Judge Kiser's analysis
illustrated the absurdity of such a proposition.
"I' Id. (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 347). In Bass, however, the Court held that
unless Congress unambiguously finds a connection to commerce for all cases, the
prosecution must prove a connection in each individual case. See Bass, 404 U.S.
at 347 The question in Bass, therefore, was not whether Congress could sustain
the statute based on the commerce power, but simply whether individual proof
was required as opposed to a general congressional finding.
132 Brzonkala, 935 F Supp. at 792.
133 id.
134 Id. at 792-93.
131 Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
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The differences in the approach of Brzonkala and Doe are as
significant as their differing conclusions. First, these opposite approaches
to an identical problem illustrate the difficulty of applying a decision as
singular as Lopez. Second, because the ultimate role of Lopez in
Commerce Clausejurisprudence remains ambiguous, the future of federal
statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause may be determined by
factors bearing a closer relation to politics than to constitutional law. That
is, mterpretation of complicated precedent such as Lopez may be
unusually vulnerable to a judge's political persuasions. Accordingly, until
the Supreme Court clarifies the Lopez decision, legislation as politically
charged as VAWA will likely be subject to widely differing mterpreta-
tions. However, from the language of Lopez itself, it is clear that VAWA
cannot be upheld on the basis of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
IV APPLYING LOPEZ TO VAWA
The primary threats to VAWA's constitutionality are its encroachment
into areas of law traditionally regulated by the states, and its lack of a
jurisdictional requirement ensuring that all cases arising under the civil
provision have a connection to interstate commerce. Lopez indicates that
these two characteristics of the Gun-Free School Zones Act were crucial
factors in the Court's decision. Because VAWA is closely analogous to
the act struck down m Lopez, and because it harbors issues of great
concern to the current Supreme Court, the future of VAWA is dependent
on the Court's willingness to continue the shift m Commerce Clause
jurisprudence imtiated by Lopez.
Interpretation of Lopez has been vaned. Some commentators believe
that Lopez is no more than an msigmficant twitch m modem Commerce
Clause authority One critic argues that Lopez will eventually fall into a
category of "cases that appear to be startling changes in direction
when first decided, but that are subsequently ignored by the Court." '136
This is because such cases involve an area of the law that the Court
stresses has constitutional limits, and yet these limits are never reached.
Because this "makes the Court look like a dog whose bark is worse than
its bite," occasionally someone has to be bitten in order for the warning
to have any teeth.'37 Afterwards, the Court ignores the case in question
.36 Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W RES. L. REV 877, 877
(1996).
137 Id.
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because following its lead would result in "unpalatable consequenc-
es."'38
Lopez could fall into this category because the Court has already
shown signs of discontinuing "the Lopez revolution.', 39 For example,
shortly after Lopez, the Court upheld a RICO conviction under the
Commerce Clause, and, like the Doe court, used Wickard as the relevant
precedent. 4 ' If lower courts follow Lopez, then radical changes will
occur in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a result some critics believe the
Court did not intend.' This broad application of Lopez would certainly
be reasonable, especially given the Court's insistence that it was not
departing from established Commerce Clause precedent in striking down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
Other interpretations have argued that Lopez indicates the Court's
growing sensitivity to federalism, and therefore marks an important
change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'42 However, most of these
critics believe the real change is in the Court's assertion of the substantial
effects test.'43 Tins means that stricter scrutiny will only be used when
the activity regulated does not involve a commercial or economic activity
Some analysts believe that in order to satisfy Lopez, Congress needs
merely to "dutifully engage in legislative fact-finding or, as it normally
does, include an express jurisdictional element in laws defining crimes
under the commerce power."'" Other commentators suggest that simply
providing thejunsdictional requirement will save future federal legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause. 45
138 Id.
139 Id. at 881.
140 See United States v Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995); see also Sherry,
supra note 136, at 881 (discussing as indications of the Court's move away from
Lopez: Robertson; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995); and the demal of certiorari in United States v.
Ramey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995)).
'4' See Sherry, supra note 136, at 881.
142 See, e.g., Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The
New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. Rnv 1 (1995).
113 See id. at 33.
'" Bnckey, supra note 7, at 839.
'41 See Wax, supra note 33, at 297 ("Congress can avoid rational basis
scrutiny by including a 'jurisdictional element' in future Commerce Clause
legislation."); see also Stephen R. McAllister, Lopez Has Some Merit, 5 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 12 (1996) (claiming that the criminal provisions of VAWA
"probably [are] saved by the fact that Congress included an interstate
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The jurisdictional requirement is indeed important, and it is some-
thing the civil rights provision in VAWA may be lacking. The purpose
of the provision as stated in the Act is "to protect the civil rights
of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety,
health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a
federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender."' 6 This reference to interstate commerce is the
only one contained within the civil provision. Still, some critics
think this reference may be enough to supply the jurisdictional ele-
ment.
147
Certain critics of VAWA have recognized that there may be a
jurisdictional problem with the civil rights cause of action.148 These
commentators suggest that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment
as the constitutional basis for VAWA. 149 The Fourteenth Amendment
governs state instead of private action and therefore may be inappropriate
jurisdiction for VAWA."5° The alternative argument, of course, is that
VAWA's civil rights remedy is founded on Commerce Clause jurisdic-
tion. One critic maintains that "Congress' intent in using the Commerce
Clause as the underpinning for the other provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act suggests that the Title Im [civil rights] provision
would also rest on the Commerce Clause foundation."'15
Several previous civil rights statutes have been upheld based on
Commerce Clause jurisdiction. 5 2 The most notable are those at issue
in the Katzenbach v. McClung'53 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States154 decisions. Still, this precedent was not enough for
jurisdictional requirement").
146 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
147 See, e.g., Wax, supra note 33, at 297
141 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fitzgerald, The Violence Against Women Act: Is it an
Effective Solution?, 1 How. SCROLL 46, 57 (1993).
149 See id. at 56.
"' Tis distinction was the primary reason Judge Kiser found VAWA
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Umv., 935 F Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996).
's' Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 57
152 See id. at 57-58 (citing Griffin v Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971),
upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), as an example of such legislation).
113 Katzenbachv McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See supra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text.
114 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See
supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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Judge Kiser in Brzonkala.'55 There is a strong argument that it would
not be enough for the Lopez Court either, since the activity VAWA
regulates is not commercial or economic in nature. In his concurrence to
the majority opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy stated that although the
decision gave him "some pause," he could find no commercial purpose
behind the Gun-Free School Zones Act.'5 6 This absence clearly made
the statute unconstitutional for Kennedy, and the same absence would
presumably be fatal to VAWA as well.
The language of the civil provision of VAWA states that the purpose
in creating a civil cause of action is to provide a civil rights remedy for
violence against women. Unquestionably, this purpose is the primary one
behind VAWA. Senator Joseph Biden characterized VAWA as a civil
rights remedy, and stated that "VAWA is designed to assist states' effofts
to protect women from violent crime, including rape and family violence
i57 So why does the civil rights provision of VAWA refer to
interstate commerce? The legislative history of the Act provides some
assistance in addressing tins issue, though it leaves the jurisdictional
question far from answered. The history concerning the civil rights
provision states that "current law provides a civil rights remedy for
gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for crimes of violence
motivated by gender committed on the street or in the home" and that
"crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate com-
merce."'5 8 The history goes on to state that these crimes "have a
substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national
productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the
supply of and the demand for interstate products. '159
Under some readings of current Commerce Clause law, this legisla-
tive finding is enough to ensure the Act's constitutionality Two critics
state that despite the Lopez emphasis on jurisdictional requirements,
"Congress need only 'Perez' an activity (i.e., state that the activity in
general has an effect upon commerce)" 6' in order to preserve its
,5. See Brzonkala, 935 F Supp. at 801.
156 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
,-, Biden, supra note 96, at 1301.
158 H.R. CoNF REP No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), repnnted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853.
'59 Id.
160 Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen, Note, Great Expectations: The
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Commerce Clause power. This reference is to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Perez where the Court held that Congress had
power to enforce a provision under the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
even though the provision had no jurisdictional requirement ensuring that
every transaction involved interstate commerce. 6' The Court upheld the
provision because Congress found that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions,
though purely intrastate, may affect interstate commerce."' 62
Further, if the activity as a class is within Congress's power to regulate,
then the judiciary cannot strike down the legislation because individual
acts do not affect interstate commerce.
Yet Perez came before Lopez. With the distinction in Lopez between
activities that are commercial or economic in nature and those which are
not, the "class of activities" argument is not persuasive to the Court.
Additionally, the activity regulated in Perez is clearly commercial in
nature. This is not true for either the Gun-Free School Zones Act or
VAWA. When Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence to Lopez that
it was a "necessary though limited holding,"'63 he was likely referring
to the fact that the activity regulated by the Gun-Free School Zones Act
is not economic or commercial in nature, and, therefore, does not affect
interstate commerce. Kennedy emphasized that, unlike previous Com-
merce Clause cases, in Lopez "neither the actors nor their conduct have
a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the
statute have an evident commercial nexus."'" Kennedy went on to state
that "[i]n a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an
ultimate commercial ongin or consequence, but we have not yet said the
commerce power may reach so far." 65 When Congress enacts legisla-
tion that goes so far, as it did with the Gun-Free School Zones Act, then
Kennedy believes that the judiciary must intervene to preserve the balance
of power between the federal and state governments.
The federalism concern addressed by Kennedy indicated the area in
which he was perhaps most closely aligned with the majority opimon.
Kennedy stated that while keeping guns away from schools was an
admirable plan, "considerable disagreement exists about how best to
Illusion of Federalism After United States v Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241, 264
(1996).
161 See United States v Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
162 Id. at 154.
163 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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accomplish that goal.' 66 In situations such as this, "the theory and
utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear."' 67 It is for the states to determine
whether criminal sanctions will best deter students from carrying guns to
school. 6 ' Kennedy was opposed to the Gun-Free School Zones Act
largely because it "forecloses the States from experimenting and
exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by
right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity
beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that
term."
169
The same is surely true for VAWA. If anyting, the Gun-Free School
Zones Act comes closer than VAWA to regulating an activity with
substantial effects on interstate commerce, because guns near or in
schools could have an effect on the educational environment. Education
is an area much more closely associated with the national economy than
is violence against women, and even this association was not enough for
the Lopez Court. The clearest argument for violence against women
affecting interstate commerce is that these crimes prevent women from
participating in the workforce. The legislative history of VAWA gives
almost identical reasons as did the history for the Gun-Free School Zones
Act pertaining to the effect of the regulated activity on interstate
commerce. Violence against women deters "potential victims from
traveling interstate" and "from transacting with business, and in places
involved, in interstate commerce."' 70 Crimes of violence against women
further affect interstate commerce "by diminishing national productivity,
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products."'' These arguments were all made by
the government in support of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and they
all were rejected by the Lopez Court. One of the most resounding
prmciples from Lopez is its rejection of the national productivity and
costs of crime arguments. As the majority noted, "if we were to accept
66 Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. (Kennedy, J., concumng) (citations omitted).
161 See id. at 164041 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170 H.R. CoNF REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprnted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853.
171 Id.
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the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."'7
Indeed, violence against women creeps closer to an area where the
Lopez Court explicitly states the federal government has no business -
family law Were it not for the explicit jurisdictional requirement m the
criminal provisions of VAWA, some critics believe the Act could not
survive scrutiny under the Lopez Court."' The Act does not address a
particular federal interest, and like the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
VAWA "appear[s] to be aimed at general social problems"'74 instead
of commercial activity 175 As one commentator notes, "if anything, the
172 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
'7 See McAllister, supra note 145, at 12.
174 id.
171 In Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause, Kerrie E.
Maloney observes the need for a federal remedy to combat the problem of
violence against women:
[I]t is difficult for women to find justice under traditional state criminal
laws for violent crimes committed against them. Nor have violent
crimes against women been taken seriously enough at the state level to
warrant classification as bias or hate crimes. Indeed, despite the trend
in state law toward classifying hate-motivated violence against racial,
ethnic, or religious groups as bias crimes, gender usually is not included
as a protected category. Thus, the redress of gender-motivated violence
at the state level is inadequate.
Maloney, supra note 13, at 1892-93. Maloney'sjustification for a federal remedy
continues with the observation that the civil rights provision of VAWA is "of the
sort that traditionally has been addressed at the federal level." Id. at 1896.
Because of this tradition, Maloney contends that the civil rights provision "will
not displace any state power." Id. Tis response to the federalism argument
against VAWA's civil rights provision is workable for the provision's jurisdiction
under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, recognition of the undemable
federal problem created by violence against women does not satisfy the inquiry
as to VAWA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. After Lopez, the
test for an Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause is whether the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Given the Lopez
Court's application of this test to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it appears that
VAWA's effects on interstate commerce are too remote for justification of the
provision under the Commerce Clause.
Maloney's answer to this inquiry is a reminder that "the Court has accepted
similarly remote arguments in other contexts without fear of authorizing a
limitless commerce power." Id. at 1924. Maloney then compares VAWA to the
statute at issue in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
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tradition of leaving matters of domestic violence and child support to the
States is even stronger than the tradition of leaving the defimtion and
enforcement of firearms offenses to the States.' 76 Even proponents of
the 1994 Crime Control Act admit that statutes like VAWA expand the
"jurisdiction of the federal courts into areas previously the sole responsi-
bility of the states.' 77
This concern for the expansion of federal court jurisdiction was
voiced by Chief Justice Rehnquist at the 1991 Judicial Conference. At
this Conference, Justice Rehnquist expressed specific concern that the
proposed civil provision of VAWA would cause an increase in the
number of civil claims filed in federal courts."7 ' Justice Rehnquist
(1964), which was aimed at alleviating racial discrimination. The Court found
that such a statute would remove an obstruction to interstate commerce, since
racial discrimination was shown to interfere with travel to the southern United
States. See Maloney, supra note 13, at 1924-25.
The failure of this argument lies in its reversion to Heart of Atlanta as the
relevant precedent for analyzing VAWA's constitutionality. Certainly, the Lopez
Court was aware of the similarities between the statute at issue m Heart of
Atlanta and the Gun-Free School Zones Act when it handed down the Lopez
decision. The Court's deliberate use of the substantial effects test, coupled with
its refusal to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act under Heart of Atlanta,
clearly indicates a shift m its interpretation of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. A detour around the "substantial effects" barrier constructed
in Lopez therefore travels down the wrong path for determining VAWA's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.
Maloney also poses an alternative analysis for assessing the constitutionality
of VAWA's civil rights provision:
The constitutionality of the civil rights provision could also be analyzed
under a prong of congressional Commerce Clause authority not
considered in Lopez. Instead of relying on the third category of
authority - those activities with a substantial relation to interstate
commerce - the civil rights provision could be justified under the
second, as a regulation of "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons, or tlngs in interstate commerce "
Id. at 1935. Maloney offers a legitimate alternative to the substantial effects test,
but this alternative is not likely to gain favor with a Court that has already
considered the alternatives and determined that the substantial effects test is most
appropriate.
176 McAllister, supra note 145, at 12.
7 ReneeM. Landers, ProsecutonalLimits on OverlappingFederal and State
Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 64, 64 (1996).
.7. See William Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the
1996-971
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further objected to VAWA because the Act's criminal provisions
encroach on areas traditionally left to the States.'79 As Rehnquist
observed at the Judicial Conference, VAWA's criminal provisions pumsh
acts currently puishable by state assault and battery laws. As a result of
these federalism concerns, the Judicial Conference voted to oppose the
Act.1
80
Despite Justice Rehnquist's criticisms, there are some arguments to
be made for VAWA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.
Congress did include express legislative findings in VAWA as to how the
activity regulated affects interstate commerce. The Lopez Court indicated
that, while not required, such findings are helpful in evaluating "the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s]
interstate commerce ,,181 Also significant is the Lopez Court's
reference to United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 8 2 which states
that "'this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision
of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no
reasonable alternative."" 3 The language for Commerce Clausejunsdic-
tion in the criminal provisions of VAWA may be explicit, but this
jurisdiction is far from clear in the civil remedy
CONCLUSION
Even though VAWA contains explicit legislative findings, these
findings are not enough to save the Act's constitutionality under Lopez.
The pivotal element of the Lopez analysis is whether the activity
regulated is commercial or economic in nature, and violence against
women clearly is not. Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in
Lopez, VAWA regulates local criminal activity Although acts of violence
against women certainly affect national productivity, albeit indirectly, the
same is true for all violent crime. If VAWA is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, then Congress essentially has power to regulate not
only commercial and economic activities, but anything that affects these
activities. If Lopez stands for anything, it is the assurance that congressio-
Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3.
179 See Expanding Federal Court Role Opposed: Rehnquist Says Congress is
Endangering Quality and Credibility, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1992, at A29.
80 See id.
181 United States v Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
182 United States v Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
183 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoting Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at
448).
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nal power does not go this far. Allowing the federal government to
regulate local domestic violence would be the same as admitting there is
no longer "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local."'8 4 Although many Commerce Clause cases "have taken long
steps down that road,"' 5 Lopez is a definitive step in the other direc-
tion.
'84 Id. at 1634 (citing NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
30 (1937)).
185 Id.
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